Section 5 discusses the impacts of such CER-responsive coverage decisions when there is heterogeneity in treatment effects. An important issue here is that CER may favor one treatment, deemed "the best" by some summary statistic, even though the best treatment varies across patients. Heterogeneity is necessary but not sufficient for welfare losses from product-specific reimbursement responses to CER. Rather, what's central is negative dependence across treatments; a patient may not respond to a reimbursed "winner" of CER study but may respond to a non-reimbursed "loser".
Overall, our main conclusions from the conceptual analysis is that CER has indeterminate effects on spending and patient health and, under natural assumptions on how markets respond to new quality information, may even adversely affect both. Among the factors that govern the health and spending impact of CER are the price-elasticity of supply of treatments as well as the evidence-elasticity of demand.
Section 6 provides an illustrative empirical simulation for antipsychotic drugs. This drug class is among the top spending classes covered by Medicaid and there has been considerable interest in the comparative effectiveness issues surrounding them. This is partly due to the 1999 CATIE trial that found that second generation therapies were equally effective as first-generation therapies. Following the release of this study, a policy debate emerged around how Medicaid coverage policy might respond. Many argued that Medicaid should preferentially subsidize first generation over second generation treatments. Subsequent to the release of CATIE, approximately 40% of the state-run Medicaid programs have instituted prior authorization restrictions on some second generation drugs. Little is known about the quantitative health and spending effects of such coverage proposals and policies. To better understand such effects, we simulate the impact on health and spending for the counter-factual case of providing no coverage for second generation antipsychotics 2 . We find that if Medicaid coverage policy had responded to the CER results of CATIE to by limiting second generation use then under a standard assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, it would save about 90% of class spending.
However, taking into account the observed heterogeneity in treatment effects, limiting access to second generation drugs would incur a net loss valued at about 98% of class spending. Thus, for one the largest drug classes in one of the major health care subsidy programs, heterogeneity alters not only the magnitude but also the sign of the effect reimbursement responses to CER studies.
Lastly, section 7 concludes by discussing the future research and the policy implications our analysis suggest. In particular, given the discussed problems with simplistic uses of CER as commonly discussed, we discuss new research avenues on how more useful forms of CER may be conducted.
Section 2: The Basic Framework
This section specifies the framework in which health and spending implications are analyzed and estimated. There are two aspects to CER -one is the generation of comparative information between two treatment alternatives. This is usually accomplished using randomized trials or other appropriate evaluation methodologies that produces estimates of the treatment effects. The second is the potential response by the market 3 or public payers to this information affecting the use or uptake of treatments in the population.
Consider two treatments with true treatment effects q=(q 1 ,q 2 ) which we interpret as product qualities. For example, these two treatments may be first-and second generation treatments for a given clinical condition. The beliefs over the unknown levels of quality for the two treatments are specified as F=F(q 1 ,q 2 ) before the CER and F'=F'(q 1 ,q 2 ) after the CER . Throughout, unprimed quantities denote variables, functions or levels prior to the CER and the primed quantities denote the corresponding items after the CER. The demand functions for the two treatments are given by D 1 and D 2 and depend on the perceived qualities through F as well as prices. For example, demand functions may be governed by the expected quality levels given the evidence.
We consider the impact that CER has not only on the evidence of quality of products but also on market prices and quantities. We let Y=(Y 1 , Y 2 ) and P=(P 1 ,P 2 ) denote the equilibrium quantities and prices of the two treatments. The total spending S and health outcomes Q in this class of treatments for the condition are determined by the use of both the treatments and their average cost-effectiveness is determined by their ratio
CER has two possible effects on market outcomes. First, it may generate evidence that changes quality beliefs and shifts demand and second may thereby affect equilibrium prices and quantities observed. The CER changes the average health outcome according to
Regardless of the perceived health benefits of the treatments, this states that the true quality level determines the actual health impact. Thus, the true quality differences and quantity changes complement each other in determining the overall health impact of CER so that equilibrium responses matter more when there are big quality differences.
The CER changes overall spending on the two treatments according to
There are thus two ways in which CER may affect spending. One is to through substitution across treatments and the other is through changes in equilibrium prices. Although CER is typically concerned with only evaluating effectiveness of treatments, it naturally has consequences for the cost-effectiveness of treatments through affecting both the health and spending patterns in equilibrium. More precisely, the impact of CER on cost-effectiveness is the ratio of the increased spending and health impact, ∆S/ ∆Q. Cost-effectiveness of use is raised if spending responds less than the levels of health and is lowered if spending responds much more than health governed by price or quantity responses to the CER.
Section 3: Impact of CER in a Private Market
Consider first the implications of CER in a private and competitive market, although our analysis carries over to non-competitive market structures. As illustrated in Figure 1 we assume that, without loss of generality, the demand for the superior (first) product shifts weakly outward and the demand for the inferior (second) product shifts weakly inward as a consequence of the CER; D' 1 ≥D 1 and D' 2 ≤D 2 . Moreover, we assume that the evidence of the CER is valid in the sense that these demand shifts are consistent with true quality levels; q 1 ≥q 2 . For illustrative purposes only, the Figure concerns the case when both the demand and supply curves prior to the CER coincide. The supply functions of the two products are not assumed to be affected by the CER but determined by the costs of production of the two treatments. An outward (inward) shift in demand holding supply constant raises (lowers) both the equilibrium quantity and price. In other words, for the superior treatment 1 its price and quantity rises as opposed to for the inferior treatment 2 for which they fall
By standard arguments, when demand for the two products shifts in response to the evidence generated by the CER, the equilibrium quantities and prices that result will "trace out" the supply curve as in the Figure above . Thus, the impact of CER on health and spending are not merely driven by how sensitive demand is to the evidence generated by the CER but more importantly how responsive supply is to price. Now consider the health and spending implications of these market responses to CER. As both quantity and price rise for the superior treatment, it follows directly that spending on the superior treatment rises. By analog arguments, spending on the inferior treatment falls. The impact on overall spending, ∆S, is thus indeterminate as it may rise or fall dependent on whether the positive spending effect of the superior treatment dominates the negative spending effect of the inferior treatment. However, the overall health effect is clearly positive, ∆Q≥0, as long as the evidence of the CER is valid. This is because quantity is raised for the superior treatment and lowered for the inferior second treatment. The magnitude of the health effect induced by CER is determined by the price-elasticities of supply.
To illustrate, consider the example when demand and supply for a treatment is linear D(p)=a(F)-bp and S(p)=c+dp where the demand is shifted by the treatment beliefs by assuming the intercept is a function of the beliefs F. The equilibrium quantity that equates demand and supply is then given by ( ) ( )
This implies the CER induces a change in quantity for each treatment given by
If a change in the beliefs F shifts the demand through raising (lowering) the intercept a(F) for the first (second) treatment then the impact on health, ∆Q, is governed to a large extent on how sensitive supply is to price, d. For example, it is generally true that in the standard long-run case of an infinitely elastic industry supply, corresponding to free entry, then there are no price-effects from CER. For example, this may be the case for markets for generic drugs or the market for procedures that are not patentable. In this case, ∆Y converges to a(F)-a(F') above as d goes to infinity so that the impact on health and spending is driven only through quantity effects induced by how sensitive demand is to the evidence generated by the CER.
Section 4: Impact of CER in Subsidized Market
In most countries, health care markets are subsidized thereby separating supply-prices received by sellers and demand prices paid by patients. For example, the US government through the Medicare and Medicaid program pays manufacturers and providers at prices above the co-pays of those eligible for the programs. In a market subsidized at rate s, let the equilibrium quantity, supply-and demand price for a treatment be denoted by Y (s), P S (s) and P D (s) as depicted in As illustrated in Figure 2 , for a given market it is well known a rise in the subsidy s raises the supply price, lowers the demand price, and raises the equilibrium quantity; dP S /ds ≥0, dP D /ds ≤0 , dY/ds≥0.
In a subsidized market, CER will impact health and spending not only through the demand shifts discussed earlier but also through any changes in subsidy levels set by governments as a consequence of the CER. For example, Medicare or Medicaid may expand coverage or reimburse more heavily those treatments that did well in CER through lower co-pays, reduced prior authorization, or higher reimbursement rates to manufacturers. We denote by s=(s 1 ,s 2 ) the subsidy levels for the two treatments prior to the CER and s'=(s' 1 ,s' 2 ) the corresponding subsidies after the CER. We term the coverage policy as responsive when CER leads governments to subsidize the first superior treatments relatively more compared to the second inferior treatment
We denote by ∆Q (s,s') and ∆S(s,s') the corresponding impact on overall health and spending of the treatment class for a given subsidy policy. In Figure 2 , we can trace out the impact on prices and quantities under a responsive coverage or subsidy policy. For the superior first treatment, demand shifts outward as before, but in addition the subsidy-wedge between the demand-and supply price increases. For the inferior second treatment, the demand shifts inward as before, but in addition the subsidy-wedge decreases. It follows that a responsive subsidy policy has a reinforcing multiplier-effect on prices and quantities compared to the private market effects. The subsidies act in the same direction as the changes induced by the shifts in demand implied by the CER.
More precisely, if Y 1 (F,s) and Y 2 (F,s) denote the equilibrium quantities under a given demand and subsidy structure then a responsive subsidy policy implies that not only does demand itself change quantities, but that subsidy changes those quantities further in the same direction ( ) ( ) ( )
This multiplier effect implies that the impact of CER on health is magnified under responsive subsidy policy compared to an unresponsive policy and in turn compared to no subsidies
In a subsidized market, the total spending effects are governed by the supply prices as that covers both consumer and government spending on the treatment. However, as before, there is an indeterminate effects on the spending levels, as spending on the superior first treatment rises and spending on the inferior treatment falls, although both at greater magnitudes due to the multiplier effect induced by a responsive subsidy policy.
Section 5: Impact of CER under Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
This section extends the previous analysis of health-and spending impacts of CER by considering heterogeneity in treatment effects or quality across patients. As opposed to the previous sections, responsive subsidy policy may adversely affect health in this case under some specific forms of heterogeneity described below.
We consider expectations about treatment effects that are heterogeneous, F(q, h), where the parameter h may vary across patients distributed according to G(h). The demand function for the entire patient population is the aggregated demand across these types of patients.
where D k (h) is the demand for treatment k for the patients of type h. The demand functions D'
after the CER is determined similarly by
When subsidies are responsive to overall assessments of treatments they are product-specific.
This is a problem when treatment effects are patient-specific as subsidies may favor one treatment, deemed "the best", even though the best treatment varies across patients. For this to be true, though, it is not sufficient to just have heterogeneity in treatment effects. The joint distribution of treatment effects must also span both sides of the 45-degree line as illustrated in Figure 3 . 4 In other words, each treatment is the best for some part of the population. In Figure 3 , a given point in the figure corresponds to the two qualities q for patients of a given type h and the distribution of points in the Figure Consider when a responsive subsidy policy favored the first treatment, say because it had a higher mean or median treatment effect than the second treatment. To illustrate, consider the extreme case when the second treatment was not reimbursed at all, s'2=0, and the patients of the program were too poor to be able to afford it as a consequence, Y 2 '=0. Then the patients above the 45-degree line would suffer a loss in quality corresponding to the vertical distance from their point down to the 45 degree line because the best treatment for them was not the one deemed best by the CER. This is illustrated for one such subgroup in the Figure 3 . The relative size of this negative health impact of some patients compared to the previously discussed positive impact of the rest of the population now makes the overall health impact effect indeterminate.
Heterogeneity is necessary bit not sufficient for this to occur. What's more important is negative dependence so that some treatments are above the 45 degree line and other below it. Negative dependence means that the patients who did not respond on the reimbursed winner of the CER may respond on the non-reimbursed looser. More generally, the average quality before and after the CER are given by
where the quality expectations E k and E' k , k=1,2 are the average quality levels conditional on selecting the treatment before and after the CER. The impact on health Q'-Q therefore partly determined by the effects among people who change their treatment choices due to the responsive policy, as is also the case under homogenous treatment effects. However, in the heterogeneous case, this impact comprises of the effect on those whose new choices lead to better outcomes and the effect on those whose new choices lead to inferior outcomes. The degree of heterogeneity and the extent of self-selection before the responsive policy would determine the overall effect of these two groups.
A responsive subsidy policy may alter quantity towards the first treatment that is superior on average but, due to heterogeneity, the overall effect on those selecting into that treatment may very well be negative. For example, if due to a responsive subsidies the demand for the first treatment absorbs the demand for the second treatment, then Y' 1 =Y 1 +Y 2 . This implies that the impact on health is given as
which is determined by the changes in average effects for those who selected into either treatment prior to the CER. If, prior to CER, patients were able to select treatment that were more beneficial on average for them, then 1 1 1 2 & ′ ′ < < E E E E and the overall health impact of CER could be negative. However, if patents were incorrect in their choice prior to CER, then the impact could be positive 5 .
Because of the potential negative impact on health from responsive subsidies or coverage policies, CER may have indeterminate effect on incremental cost-effectiveness, CE=∆ S/∆ Q. This is because the cost per unit of quality may fall or rise dependent on the patient heterogeneity in the population. For example, in Figure 3 above if responsive subsidies induces everyone to choose the first treatment even when it is not optimal then clearly average quality of care is lowered, thereby lowering cost-effectiveness under constant prices.
Section 6: Empirical Analysis of Responsive Subsidies for Antipsychotics
In this section, we conduct an illustrative empirical analysis of the potential impact of CER responsive subsidies using the case of antipsychotic drugs. These drugs represent one of the largest drug classes in one of the major US public subsidy programs, Medicaid (Bruen and Ghosh, 2004) . Antipsychotic drugs represent the primary treatments for patients with schizophrenia. Beginning from 1990 a second generation of antipsychotic drugs, also known as the atypical antipsychotics (AA) were introduced. These drugs are believed to cause less movement disorders as side effects compared to the first generation antipsychotics (also known as typical or neuroleptics) (Kane, 2004; Meltzer 2009 ). More recently, some of the second generation antipsychotics have been linked to increased metabolic side-effects such as weight gain and diabetes (Meltzer, 2005) .
We consider the recent CER (CATIE trial) that was conducted for antipsychotics in the US (Lieberman et al, 2005) , following a series of other comparative effectiveness studies conducted on this issue (Polsky et al., 2006; Leucht et al., 2009 (Banthin and Miller, 2006) . Several CATIE investigators, including the authors of the CATIE study, have stated that that study was not designed to directly answer questions of policy regarding access to antipsychotic drugs, while others have suggested that the CATIE results clearly established that it is wasteful to use public funds to pay for second-generation antipsychotics, a perspective that has been adopted by some influential media outlets, and some pharmacy benefit managers (Rosenheck, 2007; NY Times, 2005; Soumerai and Law, 2007 ) .
This has put pressure on various states' public health officials to cut their budgets by restricting coverage on the AAs (Carey, 2005) and has led to considerable policy debate on whether the effectiveness evidence generated by the CATIE trial should be used as basis for limiting reimbursement or coverage for AAs, that is, whether subsidies should be responsive to the CER (Parks et al., 2008) . Debate about the comparative effectiveness of these drugs persists (AHRQ EPC Project, 2009).
We examine two highly debated counter-factual policy options, which severely restricts access to
AAs and compare them to the pre-CATIE scenario where AAs were not restricted. Using results from the CATIE trial, we trace out the health and spending effects of the two responsive policy
positions and examine what determines those effects. Since Medicaid is one of the primary payer of antipsychotic medications, and since much of the policy debate has been about appropriate public reimbursement responses to CER, our discussions will surround the Medicaid population of non-elderly adult patients with schizophrenia. We stress the fact that none of these policy positions we consider, which severely restricts access to AAs, were actually implemented in real practice, partly owing to concerns regarding design issues of the CATIE trial and to avoid the potential adverse impact on health associated with such restrictions for this very vulnerable population (Parks et al., 2008; Meltzer et al., 2009 ). Nevertheless, as described previously, access to some AAs was restricted through prior authorization (PA) policies by approximately 40 percent of state Medicaid programs in 2005, 6 many having PA requirements for multiple drugs (Polinski et al, 2007) . Even with the recognition in the research literature on the biological heterogeneity in treatment effects and outcomes in schizophrenia, CER studies such as CATIE may have reinforced the will for instituting these stringent access restriction policies.
However, less is understood about the consequences of such policies especially when different subgroups of the patient population find the largest benefits from different drugs. The goal here is therefore to trace out the implications of these policies by intentionally using very drastic coverage restriction scenarios, not to argue that they should or should not be implemented. The rationale is that, if we see welfare is enhanced even in these restricted scenarios, we will be more confident about the impact of CER-responsive policy changes. Otherwise, our illustration points out the implications of CER and the potential consequences of responsive policies.
Evidence on treatment effect heterogeneity
Our concern about the effects of responsive subsidies applied to treatments, when different subgroups of patients may find alternative treatments to be beneficial, can be highlighted by illustrating responses to different drugs by the same patient. This can be achieved using data from the CATIE trial, as unlike traditional randomized designs, CATIE followed a novel approach where patients, who discontinued their first drug assignment, were re-randomized to receive an alternative drug. This design aspect of CATIE helps to establish the joint distribution of effects from alternative drugs for the same individuals, conditional on the fact that these individuals discontinued from one of them.
We reanalyze the individual level CATIE data to estimate the joint distribution of treatment effects between risperidone as the 1st line and olanzapine or quetiapine as the second line drug.
The data only allowed us to estimate the effects of these second generation drugs, but nevertheless illustrates our point about treatment effect heterogeneity. Since these drugs influence both the symptoms and the side-effect profile in patients, we study the health effects of these drugs in terms of quality-adjusted life year that integrates these effects into a single metric.
We use the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) scores, which measure severity of psychotic symptoms among patients with schizophrenia, to compute a severity index and then assign quality of life weights to each severity category. Similarly, we assign quality of life weights to each of the most common side-effects, akathisia, akinesia and weight gain. Overall quality of life for a patient at any given time is computed by taking the minimum of the symptom-based QOL and side-effects based QOL. The key outcome on which comparisons are made is the average monthly change in QOL, modeled using linear mixed-effects models. risperidone are expected to obtain a positive benefit from switching to either olanzapine or quetiapine. For some (individuals above the 45-degree line), the benefits on the second generation drugs are larger than that they were experiencing while using the first generation drug. Such evidence raises concern regarding restricted access to these drugs. Likewise, for those below the 45 degree line, the benefits of risperidone therapy were larger.
7 Note that we could not establish such a joint distribution of effects for the use of first generation pherphenazine in Phase I due to limited sample size in the CATIE trial.
Note that heterogeneity in treatment effects is a necessary but not sufficient condition for responsive subsidies to induce welfare loss. Even if there was heterogeneity but the entire joint distribution was below or above the 45-degree line, there would be little loss from responsive subsidies. What central is whether there the best treatment differs across patients. For example, if there is positive covariance then not responding on a first-line therapy may imply the patient won't respond on second-line therapies as well. However, if there is independence or negative correlation, then failing one treatment means the next is more likely to succeed. The lack of dependence illustrated in the figure above is therefore central for the negative health impact we simulate below.
Simulated Pre-CER levels (Pre-CATIE scenario)
We consider when prior to the CER (CATIE) both generation antipsychotics are covered under the Medicaid program. Since the second generation drugs are costlier, this resembles a greater subsidy on the second generation drugs compared to first generation drugs (i.e. s 2 ≥ s 1 ).
Demand for these drugs are partly determined by the demand prices faced by the patients, which were close to zero, i.e. P D (s) =0, so that overall spending closely coincide with the supply prices P S and has been substantial incurred by Medicaid for this class. 8 Demand is also affected by heterogeneity in treatment effects as with unrestricted coverage physicians were able to try out alternative drugs and often settle on a drug that appears to produce better quality for an individual patient. That is, irrespective of the drug that a patient initiates on, the physician can switch patients as needed to an alternative drug that may be more efficacious for that patient.
Since this resembles the standard practice in the pre-CATIE era, we capture the overall effect of these switches using the intention-to-treat effects of specific drug initiation from CATIE data.
8 Total Medicaid expenditures on antipsychotic medication increased from $484 million in 1995 to $1.3 billion in 1998 (Lewin Group, 2000) . In 2004, the annual health care costs for patients with schizophrenia is estimated to be about US $28 billion, of which nearly one-third can be attributed to pharmacy costs (Gilmer et al., 2004) . More recent estimates suggest that expenditures on antipsychotic medications across all payers have crossed $10 billion this year and account for a third to a half of all mental health expenditures (NIMH, 2006) .
We focus on three second-generation antipsychotic drugs, risperidone, olanzapine, quetiapine as well as one first generation drug perphenazine. These comprise nearly 70% of the market of antipsychotic prescriptions written in the United States. Wu et al. (2006) estimated prevalence of diagnosed schizophrenia among non-elderly Medicaid patients to be 1.66%. We apply this estimate to about 15 million non-elderly adult Medicaid enrollees (www.statehealthfacts.org) to obtain a total number of 250,000 non-elderly adult enrollees with schizophrenia. We assume that the drug-specific shares of scripts estimated from the 2005 IMS data represent equilibrium shares of use both across patients at the initial assignment and within each initial assignment over a one year period. Therefore, we use these shares to split the 250,000 patients with schizophrenia to obtain the number of patients initiating with each of these drug. The Pre-CATIE scenario is now shown in Figure 5 . The total number of scripts (Y k ) for each drug over a one year period is calculated by multiplying the number of patients initiated on a drug times twelve 30-day scripts. 9 Similarly, the total health effect E k generated from a drug initiation is calculated by multiplying the number of patients initiated on this drug with the corresponding intention-to-treat monthly change in QOL that are 9 All patients do not continue on their initially assigned drug but can switch to alternative drugs as they have access to all the alternatives. However, in equilibrium, the estimated share of scripts from IMS data will reflect these switching.
Billions $ / 1000 QALYS estimated from CATIE data (shown in Figure 5 and summarized in Table A1 ). 10 For example, 90,000 patients inititated on quetiapine. They are expected to experience 0.003 monthly increments in their quality of life. Therefore the total annual QALYs experienced by this cohort is calculated as 90,000 X 0.003 X 12 = 3240 QALYS. Similar calculation are made for each drug initiation and then the total benefits are summed across all the drug initiations. Similarly, total costs under this policy is calculated by multiplying the number of patients initiated on a drug with the corresponding intention-to-treat effects ( Figure 5 and summarized in Table A1 ) on total drugs and services costs that were reported by Rosenheck et al (2005) in their Supplemental Table C (reproduced here in Table A1 ). Of these costs, about 18 -34% is due to the use of any of the antipsychotic medications under study ( Table A1 ). Note that the overall health outcomes and costs across each drug initiation-arm in the figure are relatively homogeneous, partly due to that these are intent to treat effects that involved substantial switching to drugs not started on.
Simulated Post-CER levels (Post-CATIE scenarios)
To simulate the effects of a highly restrictive CER-responsive subsidy policy, we compare the pre-CATIE scenario with two hypothetical (counter-factual) post-CER scenarios. In the first scenario, in response to the CATIE results the responsive subsidy policy entails the second generation drug not being covered; s' 2 =0. Given the low income of the Medicaid population, this is assumed to eliminate demand in this population so that the post-CER quantity satisfies Y' 2 =0. 11 This case is included as it provides an upper bound on the harmful effects of a subsidy response, the lower bound being induced by no response occurring at all (i.e. pre-CER policy remains). In the second scenario, under the responsive subsidy policy the second generation 10 These intention-to-treat effects represent the average quality levels for a given initial drug assignments after incorporating the effect of trial-and-error selection into the best treatment. We apply mixed effects linear models to individual-level longitudinal quality of life data from CATIE and estimate the intention-to-treat effects of the initial assignment of alternative drugs. Specifically, we look at look at the coefficients on treatment-time interaction to compare the average rate of change in QALYs under alterative first line treatment. 11 It is stressed that this is a very extreme form of restriction. Usually, such a scenario, if at all exists, would often have the appeals process through which the patient can get an atypical drug. Appeals process is a more stringent version of PA policies. It is not clear how long such appeals usually takes and whether patients are more likely to give up switching to another drugs given this hurdle. We certainly see effects to this end for PA policies ( Soumerai et al., 2007) .
drugs are again subsidized less than before , s' 2 < s 2 , but only one of the second-generation drugs is covered , thereby allowing Y' 2 to be positive.
Post-CATIE scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario #1:
The post-CER scenario #1 is illustrated in Figure 6 . In this scenario, the typical antipsychotic (perphenazine) is the only drug subsidized and the atypicals are not reimbursed. That is, s' 1 is set so that the consumer price is zero and the second subsidy is eliminated, s' 2 =0. We will assume that all patients are initiated with perphenazine, 25% these patients (estimated using CATIE data)
will find perphenazine to be efficacious and tolerable and therefore continue on it. The remaining 75% will discontinue perphenazine after six months (median time to discontinuation estimated using CATIE data) but will not be able to switch to other drugs due to lack of subsidies ( i.e.
Y' 2 =0), and thus will be without drug therapy for the remaining six months. We run separate mixed effects models to estimate the effect of the initially assigned drug on monthly changes in quality of life over the duration of the trial for those who continued on their initial assignment and till the time of discontinuation for those who discontinued the initially assigned drug. These estimates are shown in Figure 6 and also summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Billions $ / 1000 QALYS
Among the discontinuers, we assume that 11% of them will have a relapse (Weiden and Olfson, 1995) and the remaining will not experience any more gain in their quality of life in that year.
Patient who relapse, will on average experience two hospitalization (Weiden and Olfson, 1995) worth $14,000 each and a loss in quality of life of 0.45 per patient (Lenert et al. 2004 ).
Total QALYs under this scenario are calculated as follows. Continuers accumulate the average monthly change in QOL, estimated from among perphenazine continuers in the CATIE data, over 12 months. Discontinuers accumulate the average monthly change in QOL, estimated from among perphenazine discontinuers from CATIE data, for 6 months before they discontinue perphenazine, and zero QOL change thereafter. Among discontinuers, those who relapse experience an additional loss of 0.45 QOL units per patient (Lenert et al. 2004 ). Similarly, total costs are calculated as follows. Continuers accumulate the estimated average monthly costs (drugs plus services use) among perphenazine continuers over 12 months.
Monthly costs for the compliant group are calculated based on the estimates on total drugs and services reported by Rosenheck et al (2005) in their Supplemental Table D , where treatment crossovers were excluded. The same monthly costs are applied to the noncompliant group during the first 6 month when they were on perphenazine. After discontinuation, patients continue to accumulate the average monthly services costs ( but not any drug costs 12 ) and also additional costs of hospitalization due to relapse.
Post-CATIE scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario #2:
The post-CER scenario #2 is illustrated in Figure 7 . In this second scenario, the typical antipsychotic (perphenazine) but also one atypical antipsychotic are subsidized with the other atypicals still not reimbursed. That is, s' 2 for one atypical and s' 1 are set so that the consumer prices are zero for each while s' 2 =0 for all other atypicals. We will consider risperidone to be the atypical reimbursed, as it is the only generic AA available in the market and also consistently finds itself in the top tier of preferred drug lists across most Medicaids. We assume that all patients who had chosen an atypical to initiate their treatment under the pre-CER policy would now choose to initiate treatment with risperidone as it is the only atypical covered.
Similar to Scenario #1 above, we will assume that among all patients who initiate with risperidone, 26% (estimated using CATIE data) will find risperidone to be efficacious and tolerable and therefore continue on it. The remaining 74% will discontinue risperidone after 5 months (median time to discontinuation estimated using CATIE data). Patients initiating with perphenazine will follow the same route as in scenario #1, with 25% of the patients staying on the drug for the full year and 75% discontinuing after 6 months.
Unlike Scenario #1 where there is only drug available, in this scenario, discontinuers of either perphenazine or risperidone can switch to the alternative and prevent relapse. Since we do not directly have an estimate for the magnitude of such an effect from the CATIE data, we will assume that the relapse rate among discontinuers from either arm reduces from 11% to 5%.
Patient who relapse, will on average experience two hospitalization (Weiden and Olfson, 1995) worth $14,000 each and a loss in quality of life of 0.45 per patient (Lenert et al. 2004 ). 
Billions $ / 1000 QALYS
Following Scenario #1, we use the QOL effects for continuers and discontinuers for the corresponding drug assignment (as indicated in Figure 7 and summarized in Table A2 ) to calculate the total effect of this assignment. For risperidone, the QOL-effect among those who discontinue is found to be negative but not statistically significant (Table A2) . Therefore, we assume a zero monthly change in QOL for the discontinuers during the first five months when they are on risperidone. Similarly, costs for the compliant groups under each drug initiation are calculated based on the estimates on total drugs and services reported by Rosenheck et al (2005) in their Supplemental Table D , where treatment crossovers were excluded. The same monthly costs are applied to the noncompliant group during the month when they were on their initial assignment. After discontinuation, patients continue to accumulate the assignment-specific average monthly services costs and additional costs of hospitalization due to relapse.
In order to be conservative, we ignore the number of scripts sold to patients who switch to risperidone after discontinuing from perphenazine and vice versa. We will defer the discussion of price responses for risperidone that is expected as its equilibrium quantity soars to the next section.
We compare the expected incremental costs and benefits, in terms of Quality adjusted life years (QALYs),) between the pre-and post CER scenarios.
Results

Pre-CATIE Scenario:
The number of 30-day scripts (Y) for each drug sold in a year are estimated to be 1.1 million for quetiapine, 0.9 million for risperidone, 0.6 millions for olanzapine and 0.4 million for perphenazine. Based on the intention-to-treat effects of initial assignment, the total annual QALYS (Q) generated across all treatments adds to 8,732 while the total costs adds to $4.5B.
Based on estimates from the CATIE trial (Table A1) , the class spending on antipsychotics by
Medicaid for this target population is $1.33B. This amounts to 29.5% of total health care spending for these patients.
Post-CATIE Scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario#1:
When all of the 250,000 patients are started on perphenazine, 25% of them continue with it and generate a total of 2,175 QALYs and $0.7B in total annual costs. Those who discontinue perphenazine but do not relapse obtain an additional 2,403 of QALYs and incur $1.8B in spending. Those who discontinue perphenazine and relapse suffer a loss of 8,984 QALYs and add $0.8B in spending. Consequently, this post-CER scenario would produce a loss of 4,406
QALYs at total annual costs of $3.3B, mainly due to the severe effect on the quality of life of those who relapse due to the unavailability of drugs.
Post-CATIE Scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario#2:
When the first generation drug perphenazine and the second generation drug risperidone are the only two drugs that are subsidized, 35,000 patients initiate with perphenazine and the rest with risperidone. Patients initiating with risperidone will generate a net loss of 1,504 QALYs and those initiating on perphenazine will generate a net gain of 90 QALYs, totaling to a net loss of 1,414 QALYs for this scenario at a cost of $4.0B. (Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998) of alternative policies when each QALY is valued at $100,000. (Table 1) , or about 8% of total class spending on antipsychotics by Medicaid in this population. CATIE-responsive subsidies in Scenario #2 will incur $4.0B in spending and a loss of 1,414 QALYs. Compared to the pre-CATIE policy, Scenario #2 will generate an additional loss of 10,146 QALYs and cost savings of $0.5 billion dollars. These savings are only worth the money if the societal willingness to pay for an additional QALY falls below $50,000.
Incremental cost-effectiveness of alternative policies
At a threshold of $100,000 per QALY, this CATIE-responsive policy scenario #2 will result in an annual loss of $0.5 billion dollars in value compared to pre-CATIE policy (Table 1) , or about 38% of total class spending by Medicaid in this population.
The Importance of Price Responses
More generally, the debate about whether second generation treatments should be reimbursed at par with first generation drugs is somewhat misguided as it relies on the wrong evidence to argue that higher-priced second generation treatments are equally effective but less cost-effective than lower-priced first generation treatments. First, in the presence of treatment heterogeneity, costeffectiveness of treatments often do not translate to cost-effectiveness of coverage policies.
Second, cost-effectiveness analysis often use effectiveness evidence after the CER but prices before the CER, that is, F' and p in our framework. Rather, what should matter is the evidence and prices both after the CER, F' and p' in our framework. The important point here is that the prices after the CER will adjust dependent on whatever the responsive subsidy rules are. Thus, endogenous pricing is central to any conclusion of appropriate reimbursement after the CER.
Even if, hypothetically, the social willingness to pay was less than $90K/QALY and the estimates from scenario #1 were considered to be precise, which would have favored the CATIEresponsive subsidy policy #1, prices of atypical could have adjusted in response to the new evidence. Any estimates of cost-savings from not reimbursing second generation treatments assuming that p'=p are unlikely to be consistent with actual pricing behavior after the CER.
Those cost-savings may be an upper bound and should contrasted to cost-savings that occur under a given reimbursement rule in place. The endogenous nature of prices given government subsidy rules is central to determine the welfare effects of reimbursement of first vs second generation antipsychotics.
Section 7: Concluding Remarks
Given the growth in public subsidization of CER to raise quality and lower cost, little conceptual and empirical understanding exists concerning the quantitative impact of CER. This paper analyzed the impact of CER on patient health and costs interpreting CER to shift the demand from some treatments at the expense of others. We traced out the general spending and health implications of such shifts in private-as well as subsidized health care markets. In contrast to commonly held views, our analysis implies that CER may well increase quality of care but also spending when treatment effects are homogenous; in contrast, CER may increase spending and adversely impact health under plausible assumptions of how markets respond to quality information. This was particularly relevant when treatment effects are heterogeneous as product specific coverage policies failed to account for patient-specific treatment effects. We illustrated these economic effects for antipsychotics that are among the largest drug classes of the US Medicaid program and for which CER has been conducted. We simulated that if subsidies were eliminated for atypical based CATIE trial, a loss of value at 8% of class spending would be observed.
Concerns about the implications of CER-responsive subsidy policies in the face of heterogeneous treatment effects cut across many other clinical scenarios. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a single drug class where the drug that is best for one patient is always best for every other patient.
The literature is voluminous on the many other classes to which our analysis may generalize including, for example, the use of antipsychotics drugs in Alzheimer's disease (Schneider et al., 2006) , use of antihypertensive drugs (Matchar et al., 2008) and the treatments for clinically localized prostate cancer (Wilt, 2008 suggested by the data we considered for the CATIE trial, learning about the joint distribution is of great value (Basu, 2009) . CER should be tailored to incorporate such dependence when trial and error of finding the right treatment for the right patient is of importance.
Beyond improving the forms of CER that are done to go beyond mean treatment effects for large populations, our analysis needs to be extended in several directions. First, future analysis should consider the impact of market power on the analysis, but we refrained from this analysis here as it would yield similar implications to the competitive case discussed. The basic quantity and price implications of CER will likely carry over to some non-competitive market conditions as well. For example, standard monopoly analysis would imply that an outward (inward) shift in demand raises (lowers) price and quantity, just as in the competitive case discussed here. Under the case when both treatments have market-power, many differentiated oligopoly models may also imply the quantity and price implications discussed in response to the demand shifts discussed to be induced by CER.
Second, evaluating the effects of CER is a special case of the general issue of assessing the value of randomized clinical trials for understanding real treatment choices in a real health care setting.
This is so because a RCT investigates effects under different prices and information than what is present after the RCT. Using the discussed framework for a more general examination of the value of RCTs for assessing patient welfare in real world markets is an important area of future research.
Third, a better understanding needs to be developed when and in what areas public technology assessment offers an added value beyond similar private market activities (Meltzer et al, 2007) .
For example, intellectual property on medical products such as drugs and devices implies strong incentives on manufacturers to get the right information generated about the quality of their products or the lack of quality of their competitors' products. This is in opposition to procedures which without patents have no owners with similar protective interests. In addition, many countries mandate quality evidence to be produced, in the US through the FDA, before marketing. This suggests that the biggest impact of public subsidies for these activities will be for procedures and not products. This would be supported by evidence showing that the share of private funding for technology assessments was higher for patented medical products than it was for generic products or procedures.
As a better understanding develops along these lines, we hope that improved evaluation can take place regarding the value of public technology assessments in general and CER in particular. As it stands right now, there are no methods to quantitatively assess the impact from these activities and why they improve on private sector activities aimed at the same purpose. We hope that quantitative frameworks similar to the ones discussed here will help to bridge that gap, making precise assessments of the value of public subsidies for technology assessments feasible and more common. 
Appendix: Estimates from CATIE analysis
